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Abstract
In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model of open economies,
where countries di¤er with respect to the quality of property rights. Within this
context, we analyze two types of reforms. First, we look at growth and welfare
e¤ects of removing capital controls, given the degree of property rights protec-
tion. Second, we endogenize the quality of property rights and study the political
support for a reform aimed at improving it. We show that, in countries where
property rights are poorly protected, the liberalization of capital movements, that
may or may not foster economic growth in the short-run, eliminates the possi-
bility of sustained physical capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the removal of
capital controls may bene…t the agents alive at the time of liberalization, leaving
a burden for future generations. Ceteris paribus, the political support for a re-
form of property rights will be stronger in the closed economy than in the open
economy.
JEL Classi…cation: F43, O16
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1. Introduction
Why do growth rates di¤er across countries? Why have some countries become
increasingly poor relative to the rest of the world? Among other explanations,
many economists (see, for instance, North (1981, 1987)) have recognized the
strong adverse e¤ects of poor protection of property rights on investment and
economic growth. Recent contributions (see, in particular, Knack and Keefer
(1995)) have found strong empirical support for this view and have detected a
statistically signi…cant positive relationship between the quality of property rights
and the rate of economic growth.
In the endogenous growth theory, savings and the accumulation of a broad
concept of capital are the determinants of the long-run rate of growth of the
economy. When the rate of return on capital appropriated by investors is low due
to insecure property rights, the rate of growth is necessarily low. However, this
theory deals mostly with closed economies and is able to explain cross-country
di¤erences in rates of growth only when international capital markets are absent.
In fact, if international borrowing and lending is allowed, most endogenous growth
models imply a simple, but highly unrealistic, solution to the underdevelopment
problem caused by transaction costs or poorly protected property rights: less
developed countries should open up their capital markets and let agents enjoy
the high rate of return on their investments abroad.1
This paper deals with two related issues. First, it analyzes the e¤ects of the
liberalization of capital ‡ows on the rate of growth of the economy and on the
welfare of the agents, when countries are di¤erent with respect to the degree of
protection of property rights. Second, it studies if and how economic incentives
to carry out a reform of the property rights system are a¤ected by the degree of
…nancial liberalization.
With regard to the …rst issue, using a simple endogenous growth model with
overlapping generations, we show that, in the presence of high transaction costs
and poor protection of property rights, the liberalization of capital movements,
although possibly implying a short-run growth-enhancing e¤ect, eliminates the
possibility of sustained capital accumulation. Therefore, when property rights
are poorly protected, …nancial liberalization eventually worsens the underdevel-
1For a discussion of endogenous growth models with capital ‡ows see Rebelo (1992) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
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opment problem and implies a welfare loss for future generations.
Nevertheless, the welfare of current generations may increase following lib-
eralization of capital movements. The opening of capital markets has di¤erent
implications for young and old generations, who earn their incomes from di¤er-
ent factors of production, labor and physical capital. When it triggers a capital
in‡ow, it bene…ts the young (through the increase of the wage rate) but hurts the
old (through the decrease of the interest rate). The opposite is true in the case
of a capital out‡ow. However, if capital out‡ows are not too large, we show that
both the young and the old bene…t from the removal of capital controls.
Thus, …nancial liberalization creates two types of distributional con‡icts. On
the one hand, unless liberalization induces small capital out‡ows, a con‡ict arises
between current generations, who own di¤erent factors of production; on the other
hand, a con‡ict will certainly arise between current and future generations, since
…nancial liberalization brings about low (and eventually zero) rates of growth in
the long run.
Turning to the second issue, our model provides a possible explanation for
why many countries do not reform their legal systems and devise institutional
structures that guarantee e¤ective enforcement mechanisms. This is an interest-
ing question, since it is generally accepted that ine¢cient property rights result
in stagnation or decline and it is not obvious why governments do not try to
alleviate this problem.
Facing the problem of underdevelopment or currency crises in less developed
countries, international organizations usually condition their intervention plans
on the acceptance, by the receiving country, of a reform package which includes
…nancial liberalization. The rationale behind this procedure is that the open-
ing of capital markets and the liberalization of capital ‡ows is considered as a
preliminary and necessary reform for developing countries to reach high rates of
economic growth and improve national welfare.2 Our paper challenges this view.
It suggests that growth-enhancing reforms, such as those aimed at improving
property rights protection, may not gain enough social consensus in a country
which is …nancially integrated with the rest of the world and can be more eas-
ily implemented in a country which keeps capital controls. In other words, the
timing of reforms turns out to be crucial. If …nancial markets are liberalized be-
2See, for example, Williamson (1994).
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fore institutions concerned with contractual rights and enforcement mechanisms
are set up or reformed, the quality of these institutions is likely to remain low
and the country will eventually su¤er from low rates of capital accumulation and
economic growth.
We focus on the relationship between costs and bene…ts of reforming property
rights and the degree of openness of the economy. Assuming that this type of
reform entails a cost for current generations and its bene…ts are delayed, we can
conclude that, when capital movements are restricted, the young may voluntarily
choose to pay the cost of the reform in order to enjoy a higher rate of return
on their savings in the future. If the old have to give up even a small fraction
of their income to …nance the reform, they will be certainly against it, since the
bene…ts will show up when they will be dead. Thus, if the cost of reform is paid
exclusively by the young, there are cases where the reform turns out to be Pareto-
e¢cient and therefore unanimously accepted. On the other hand, if capital is free
to move across borders, the rate of return is at any point in time determined
abroad, and the bene…t for the young vanishes. In this case, the old will not be
hurt by the reform, whenever taxes are levied on domestic income (they will be
hurt if taxes are levied on national income); however, when domestic income is
taxed, the country will experience capital out‡ows which will lower the level of
income and welfare of the young. In conclusion, in the open economy the reform
cannot be Pareto-e¢cient and therefore is much less politically viable.
Our paper is related to various strands of literature. An empirical literature
shows the existence of a positive association between property rights protection,
investment and economic growth. Some authors use political instability as a proxy
for the degree of property right protection (see Kormendi and Meguire (1985),
Barro (1991), Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996)). Svensson (1995) and
especially Knack and Keefer (1995) use more direct and accurate indicators of
the security of property rights. Velasco and Tornell (1991) and Checchi (1996)
study the distributional e¤ects of capital movements and derive capital ‡ights as
the outcome of non-cooperative games between heterogenous agents. Models of
growth that incorporate the notion of property rights are in Cohen and Michel
(1991), Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Co-
hen and Michel analyze an economy where property rights on foreign capital are
subject to renegotiation by domestic government. The credibility of the govern-
ment with respect to the defence of property rights is endogenously determined
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together with the rate of growth of the economy. Tornell and Velasco analyze
capital ‡ight in a dynamic model of the tragedy of the commons. In their work,
capital ‡ight does not necessarily reduce growth and welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the closed economy
model, which is extended to the open economy case in Section 3. Section 4
analyzes the distributional e¤ects of the reform of property rights in the closed
and the open economy and Section 5 concludes.
2. The closed economy
Consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of identical agents
living for two periods. In each period, a new generation is born, whose mass is
normalized to one.
A representative agent born at time t solves the following problem, taking the
wage rate wt and the interest rate rt+1 as given :
Max
ctt;c
t
t+1
u(ctt; c
t
t+1) = ln c
t
t + ¯ ln c
t
t+1
s:to : ctt + st · wt (2.1)
ctt+1 · (1 + rt+1) st³
ctt; c
t
t+1
´
¸ 0
where cvt denotes consumption at time t of an individual born at time v and st
represents savings at time t.
Output is produced according to the following production function:
yt = AÃ
³
kt
´
k®t n
1¡®
t (2.2)
where Ã
³
kt
´
represents external e¤ects of the aggregate capital stock on the
production function of each …rm. Clearly, in equilibrium kt = kt:
Physical capital accumulation is given by
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + xt (2.3)
where xt denotes gross investment.
Equilibrium in the factor markets requires nt = 1; and
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qt = A®Ã
³
kt
´
k®¡1t (1 ¡ ") (2.4)
wt = A (1 ¡ ®)Ã
³
kt
´
k®t (1 ¡ ") (2.5)
where qt denotes the rental rate of capital at time t. The parameter " 2 [0; 1] de-
notes the degree of property rights protection. The higher is ", the less protected
are the property rights.3
Equilibrium in the output market requires:
(1 + ¯)kt+1 = A¯ (1 ¡ ®)k®t Ã
³
kt
´
(1 ¡ ") (2.6)
that is, saving of the young must equal tomorrow’s demand for capital.
Finally, the no arbitrage condition implies that
rt = qt ¡ ± (2.7)
Let Ã
³
kt
´
= a + k
1¡®
t ; with a > 0: This function implies that the marginal
productivity of capital decreases as the capital stock increases, but is bounded
below by A® (1 ¡ "). Using 2.6, it can be shown that if ¯1+¯A (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ ") > 1;
the sequence fktg is increasing and does not converge.4 The rate of growth of
capital is given by:
°kt ´
kt+1
kt
=
¯
1 + ¯
A (1 ¡ ®)
³
ak®¡1t + 1
´
(1 ¡ ") (2.8)
which is decreasing with k and approaches ° = ¯1+¯A (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ ") as k goes to
in…nity.5
With regard to the dynamics of consumption, the following remark will turn
out to be useful in the remaining sections of the paper:
Remark 1. As the economy grows, both ctt and ctt+1 increase.
3This is a very simple and stylized way to introduce property rights in a growth model. Nev-
ertheless, this simple formulation serves our scope and is su¢cient to show our main argument.
The same formulation can be found in Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
4The su¢cient and necessary conditions for persistent growth in a closed economy with
overlapping generations are extensively studied in Boldrin (1992) and Jones and Manuelli (1992).
5The rate of growth of wages and GDP is given by
a(°kk)®+°kk
ak®+k
< °k: Notice that °c =
ct+1
t+1
+ctt+1
ct
t
+ct¡1
t
=
yt+1+(1¡±)kt+1¡st+1
yt+(1¡±)kt¡st =
°yyt+(1¡±)°kkt¡(¯=1+¯)°wwt
yt+(1¡±)kt¡(¯=1+¯)wt < °
k:
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By equation 2.5, we see that wt increases when kt increases. Since ctt =
1
1 + ¯
wt, we obtain that ctt is increasing with kt: In order to show that c
t
t+1 is
increasing with kt, it is su¢cient to note that ctt+1 =
¯
1 + ¯
wt (1 ¡ ± + qt+1) and
that:
wtqt+1 = A® (1 ¡ ")
³
ak®¡1t+1 wt + wt
´
(2.9)
By substituting equation 2.6 into 2.9, it is immediate to verify that the term
k®¡1t+1 wt is increasing with kt.
Thus, if " < " = 1¡ 1 + ¯
A¯ (1 ¡ ®) , our economy will experience sustained growth
of capital and consumption.
Before concluding this section, we characterize the relation between the degree
of property rights protection and the level of welfare and show that:
Lemma 1. The lifetime utility of generation t is decreasing with ".
Proof. It is easy to verify that the derivative of the lifetime utility of generation
t with respect to " has the same sign as the following derivative:
d
d"
(
lnwt + ¯ ln
"
(1 ¡ ±)wt + A® (1 ¡ ")wt + A® (1 ¡ ")a
µ
¯
1 + ¯
¶®¡1
w®t
#)
which is obviously negative.
3. The open economy
Consider now the case where the economy described in the previous section opens
up to international capital movements. We will assume that the domestic capital
stock is lower than the foreign capital stock and that the country cannot a¤ect the
worldwide interest rate. If capital is freely mobile, as soon as capital movements
are liberalized, we must have rt = rf;t where rf;t is the worldwide rate of return,
that is the interest rate prevailing in the rest of the world. Assuming that in
rest of the world " = 0; this implies that at each period in time, the level of
domestic capital stock must be lower than the level of capital stock in the rest of
the world.6
6Alternatively, we could assume that in the rest of the world the parameter " is di¤erent
from zero, but lower than in the domestic country. The qualitative results of the paper would
be unchanged, but the mathematics would be more complicated.
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The relationship between domestic and foreign capital stocks is given by the
following equation, where we omitted the time subscript:
k =
"
ak®¡1f + "
a (1 ¡ ")
# 1
®¡1
(3.1)
where kf denotes the level of foreign capital. Ceteris paribus, the higher is ", the
lower is the level of domestic capital.
With regard to the dynamics of domestic capital in the open economy, we can
begin by showing the following result:
Proposition 1. When capital ‡ows are free, the domestic economy reaches a
long-run equilibrium, with no growth, where the stock of capital is given by
k =
³
a(1¡")
"
´ 1
1¡® and the interest rate is r = A® ¡ ± :
Proof. Take the limit of (3.1) as kf ! 1:
Notice that, in the absence of capital movements, the economy experiences
perpetual growth, at a rate that approaches ¯1+¯A (1 ¡ ®) (1 ¡ "). On the con-
trary, the liberalization of capital movements eliminates the possibility of asymp-
totic growth, in presence of poor protection of property rights. Since domestic
and foreign interest rates must always be equal, the domestic capital stock cannot
grow to in…nity, as this would imply that the domestic interest rate would tend
to A® (1 ¡ ") ¡ ±: This rate is lower than the limit value of the foreign interest
rate, for kf ! 1: Investment in the domestic capital market is just su¢cient to
replace depreciated capital; as a consequence, the level of wages is constant and
there cannot be aggregate growth, even though individual consumption increases
as long as 1 + A® ¡ ± > 1¯ :
The previous result can be extended in terms of welfare as follows:
Corollary 1. In the long-run;when k ! k, all agents are hurt by the liberaliza-
tion of capital movements.
Proof. In the open economy, the long-run lifetime utility is given by ln 11+¯ +
(1 + ¯) ln w
³
k
´
+¯ ln ¯1+¯ +¯ ln (1 + r) : It easy to show that this level is always
lower than the long-run lifetime utility which would be achieved in the closed
economy, where w (k1) ! 1 and r (k1) = A® (1 ¡ ") ¡ ±:
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So far, we have analyzed the long-run e¤ects of the removal of barriers to
capital movements, and concluded that, whenever " > 0, growth will eventually
stop and liberalization will decrease the level of welfare of all agents:
Next, we turn to the short-run analysis and show the following results:
Proposition 2. In the open economy case, the rate of growth of domestic capital
°kot is at any point in time lower than the rate of growth of foreign capital °
k
f;t .
Proof. Given eq. (3.1), we have that °kot < °
k
f;t ,
ak®¡1
f;t
+"
ak®¡1f;t+1+"
<
k1¡®
f;t+1
k1¡®f;t
which is
always satis…ed since kf;t+1 > kf;t.
Let T denote the time of liberalization. Then, we have:
Corollary 2. If …nancial liberalization triggers a capital in‡ow, the rate of growth
of domestic capital immediately after liberalization, °koT ;will be lower than the rate
of growth in the closed economy, °kT .
Proof. Financial liberalization triggers a capital in‡ow if and only if qT > qf;T :
In this case, °kT > °
k
f;T : By Proposition 2, it is immediate to conclude that
°koT < °
k
T :
The rate of growth in the closed economy depends positively on the rental
rate of capital q: the higher is q, the higher is the rate of growth. Thus, if
q > (<) qf , the rate of growth at home will be higher (lower) than in the rest
of the world. Once capital markets are liberalized, rates of return on capital
are immediately equalized and q = qf at any point in time. It is easy to verify
that given qt = qf;t, qt+1 = qf;t+1 if and only if domestic capital grows more
slowly than foreign capital. Therefore, whenever in the closed economy the rate
of growth of domestic capital is higher than the rate of growth of foreign capital,
the opening of capital markets will immediately reduce the rate of growth of the
domestic economy.
When …nancial liberalization brings about a capital out‡ow, the e¤ect of lib-
eralization on the rate of growth of domestic capital at time T is indeterminate.
The domestic rate of growth will certainly be lower than the foreign rate of growth
after the liberaliztion of capital movements. Yet, since in the absence of capital
movements the domestic economy was already growing more slowly than the for-
eign economy, de…nite conclusions on the growth e¤ect of liberalization can not
be drawn in this case. Yet, it is important to note that, although the capital
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out‡ows following the removal of capital controls may imply a growth-enhancing
e¤ect in the domestic economy, such positive e¤ect on the rate of capital accu-
mulation can only be transitory, since, as we showed above, domestic capital will
eventually stop growing.
To conclude our analysis of the open economy, we study the e¤ects of …nancial
liberalization on the welfare of agents alive at time T . First, note that the old at
time T will favor (oppose) the removal of capital controls if and only if it implies
an out‡ow (in‡ow) of capital, since they enjoy a higher (lower) rate of return on
their savings. Regarding the young, we can show the following result:
Proposition 3. Let "¤ be such that qT ("¤) = qf;T and assume, without loss of
generality, that "¤ < ": Then, there exists a b" 2 ("¤; "] such that i¤ " < b"; the
liberalization of capital ‡ows is bene…cial for the generation born at time T .
Proof. Let koT denote the level of domestic capital immediately after liberaliza-
tion. When " ! 0, …nancial liberalization implies a capital in‡ow such that the
domestic level of capital jumps to the foreign level of capital, that is koT = kf;T .
By Remark 1 consumption in both periods of life is increasing with capital, which
implies that generation T gains from liberalization. When " = "¤; qT = qf;T and
there are no capital ‡ows, that is koT = kT : By Proposition 2, °
ko
T < °
k
f;T = °
k
T
(because qT = qf;T ); thus qT+1 < qf;T+1. Generation T favors liberalization of
capital movements because wage will be unchanged and the return on next period
capital will be higher. Next, notice that the lifetime utility of generation T in the
open economy is increasing with koT . Since
dkoT
d" < 0; it follows that the lifetime
utility of generation T is strictly decreasing with ". By Lemma 1, the lifetime
utility of generation T in the closed economy is also strictly decreasing with ":
Thus, we can conclude that for " 2 [0; "¤] generation T will be better o¤ in the
open economy than in the closed economy. By continuity, it will be better o¤ for
" 2 ["¤; b"].
When the rate of return on savings is higher at home than abroad (which
would be the case if domestic property rights are not too poorly protected), an
in‡ow of foreign capital will immediately follow from the liberalization of capital
movements. This capital in‡ow increases the marginal productivity of labor and
the wage rate at home. The e¤ect on the future rate of interest is ambiguous. On
the one hand, the higher level of capital implies a lower rate of growth of capital,
which tends to increase the future marginal productivity of capital. On the other
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hand, the capital in‡ow decreases its productivity. Proposition 3 shows that the
former e¤ects dominate the latter.
A di¤erent scenario arises when " is high, that is when agents can appropriate
only a small fraction of the return on their savings and the domestic interest
rate is lower than the foreign interest rate. In this case, capital will be invested
abroad, there will be an immediate capital out‡ow, which will cause the wage rate
to decline. On the other hand, agents may bene…t from a higher rate of return on
capital (since they can invest at the worldwide rate); as a consequence, the net
e¤ect of liberalization is ambiguous. Proposition 3 shows that if capital out‡ows
are small enough, generation T will bene…t from …nancial liberalization. In this
case, both young and old will unanimously be in favor of …nancial liberalization.7
To summarize, the results of this section show that, in a country where the
quality of property rights is lower than in the rest of the world, allowing capital
to move freely across borders may create distributional con‡icts among current
generations and between current and future generations. Even though future
generations will be hurt, because the open economy will eventually stop growing,
some agents (or, under some circumstances, all agents) who are alive at the time
of …nancial liberalization may bene…t from the induced capital ‡ows.
4. The reform of property rights
As we have extensively shown, poor protection of property rights has negative
e¤ects on growth both in the closed and in the open economy. In the open
economy, growth will eventually stop if the quality of property rights is lower
than abroad. This section deals with the issue of why it is the case that, in spite
of the adverse e¤ects on growth, countries do not decide to reform the system of
property rights in order to increase the rate of domestic investment.
To analyze this issue in a simple way, we will assume that the reform of
property rights entails a …xed cost which has to be …nanced with taxation on
current income. We also assume that the e¤ects of a structural reform such as
the reform of property rights are delayed, so that if the reform is undertaken,
the future productivity of labor and capital will increase for each level of capital.
Formally, we will posit that, if the reform is undertaken at time t, it is …nanced
7Notice that …nancial liberalization will be Pareto-e¢cient also in the case where it does not
trigger any capital ‡ows.
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with a tax levied on labor and capital income at a rate ¿ t; and the e¤ects of the
reform will be such that "s = 0 for s = t + 1; t + 2; :::1:8
Let us begin by investigating who gains and who loses from the reform in
the case of a closed economy. The following analysis is relevant only for gener-
ations t ¡ 1 and t, since all other generations will bene…t from secure property
rights.Without reform, the lifetime utility of the generation born at time t is given
by:
Ut = log
µ
1
1 + ¯
wt
¶
+ ¯ log
µ
¯
1 + ¯
wt (1 + rt+1)
¶
(4.1)
where wt = [A (1 ¡ ®) (ak®t + kt)] (1 ¡ ") and rt+1 = A®
³
ak®¡1t+1 + 1
´
(1 ¡ ") ¡ ±:
In the case where the reform is undertaken, the lifetime utility of generation
t becomes:
URt = log
µ
1
1 + ¯
w0t
¶
+ ¯ log
µ
¯
1 + ¯
w0t
¡
1 + r0t+1
¢¶
(4.2)
where w0t = [A (1 ¡ ®) (ak®t + kt)] (1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ¿ t) and r0t+1 = A®
³
ak0®¡1t+1 + 1
´
¡±:
Assuming for simplicity that ± = 1; subtracting equation 4.2 from equation 4.1,
it yields:
Ut ¡ URt = ¯ log (1 ¡ ") ¡ (1 + ¯) log (1 ¡ ¿ t) + ¯ log
ak®¡1t+1 + 1
ak0®¡1t+1 + 1
(4.3)
Notice that kt+1 =
¯
1+¯wt and k
0
t+1 =
¯
1+¯w
0
t. Thus, kt+1 > k
0
t+1 and the last
term in 4.3 is negative since the future marginal productivity of capital is higher
in the case of reform: From 4.3, it is easy to verify that a su¢cient condition for
the reform to be ben…cial for generation t is that log(1¡¿t)log(1¡") <
¯
1+¯ :
Agents born at time t ¡ 1, who are old at t, cannot bene…t from the reform.
Therefore, they will be either indi¤erent or against it, depending on whether they
contribute to the …nancing of the reform or not. Summarizing, we have shown
the following:
8Alternatively, we could have assumed that the quality of property rights improves gradually
after the reform. However, as long as there is some delay before the bene…ts of the reform show
up, the main argument and the qualitative results of this section will be unchanged.
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Proposition 4. In the closed economy case, a su¢cient condition for the reform
of property rights to be Pareto-e¢cient is that log(1¡¿t)log(1¡") <
¯
1+¯ and taxation falls
only on the young.
Let us turn now to the case of a small open economy. In the case of no reform,
the lifetime utility of generation t is equal to:
U¤t = log
µ
1
1 + ¯
wt
¶
+ ¯ log
µ
¯
1 + ¯
wt (1 + rt+1)
¶
(4.4)
where wt = [A (1 ¡ ®) (ak®t + kt)] (1 ¡ ") and rt+1 = rf;t+1: If the reform is carried
out, lifetime utility of generation t is given by:
U¤Rt = log
µ
1
1 + ¯
w0t
¶
+ ¯ log
µ
¯
1 + ¯
w0t
¡
1 + r0t+1
¢¶
(4.5)
where w0t =
h
A (1 ¡ ®)
³
ak®f;t + kf;t
´i
(1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ¿ t) and r0t+1 = rf;t+1: Thus, the
young will never be willing to pay the cost of reforming property rights.
Generation t ¡ 1 will either be indi¤erent or oppose the reform, since it has
to pay taxes but the rate of return on savings is …xed at the worldwide level. On
the one hand, if tax falls on domestic capital, we have that rt (1 ¡ ¿ t) = rf;t and
the old at time t will be indi¤erent, because they can still invest at the foreign
rate of return. However, whenever taxes are levied on domestic income, there
are immediate capital out‡ows which hurt generation t. Thus, in this case, the
reform of property rights cannot be Pareto e¢cient. On the other hand, if tax is
on national income, that is rt = rf;t, the old will be against the reform, because
their net rate of return will now be lower. Again, the reform of property rights
cannot be Pareto e¢cient.
To conclude this section, let us summarize and comment on our results. We
analyzed the welfare e¤ects of a reform of property rights, which is …nanced
by agents who are alive when the reform is undertaken. The crucial feature
of this reform is that bene…ts start to accrue only one period after the reform
is carried out. In this case, we showed a su¢cient condition for the reform to
be Pareto-e¢cient in the closed economy, and we showed that the same reform
cannot bene…t any of the living generations when capitals movements are free.
In other words, governments can be able to reach the necessary political support
for reforming the legal system only when agents are prevented from investing
13
their savings abroad. The main intuition is that the gains of reform for current
generations are linked to the induced increase in the future productivity of capital;
thus, whenever the domestic interest rate is forced to be equal to the worldwide
interest rate, it becomes impossible to a¤ect the domestic marginal productivity
of capital. From the point of view of development and growth, an optimal timing
of reform arises, where …rst citizens are called upon to decide whether they want
to reform property rights and then decide whether they want to liberalize capital
‡ows.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an overlapping generations model to study two re-
lated issues. First, we looked at the e¤ects of liberalization of capital movements
on the rate of growth of the economy and the welfare of agents in the presence of
transaction costs due to insecure property rights. Here, we showed that transac-
tion costs hinder the rate of economic growth, both in the closed economy and in
the open economy. In the open economy, growth will eventually stop, although
in the immediate aftermath of the …nancial liberalization the domestic rate of
growth of capital may increase as a consequence of capital out‡ows. We also
showed that if liberalization triggers a capital out‡ow (in‡ow), the old (young)
who are alive at the time of liberalization will bene…t from it and that if capital
out‡ow is small enough, both types of agents will increase their level of welfare.
Second, we explored the distributional e¤ects of a reform of property rights and
we found that, ceteris paribus, the political support for this kind of reform will be
stronger in the closed economy (where the reform can be Pareto e¢cient), than
in the open economy (where nobody gains from it).
Our model could be extended along several directions. On the one hand, the
growth mechanism could be generalized so as to encompass the possibility that
the domestic economy is initially in a steady-state with no growth. If, in the
spirit of Azariadis and Drazen [2], the external e¤ect of capital is only e¤ective
for su¢ciently high levels of the aggregate capital stock, …nancial liberalization
may imply a short run growth-enhancing e¤ect in the case of capital in‡ows,
if such in‡ows bring the economy beyond the threshold level. On the other
hand, we introduced transactions costs and ine¢cient property rights in a very
simple way, analitically equivalent to levying a proportional tax on output. As in
14
the contributions of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Grossman (1995a,
1995b), a more complex formalization of property rights may add insights on the
distributional e¤ects of liberalization of capital movements and the reform of the
legal system.
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